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Abstract
We examine if and to what extent choice dispositions can allow dependence on con-
texts and maintain consistency over time, in a dynamic environment under uncertainty.
We focus on a ‘minimal’ case of context dependence, opportunity dependence due to
being aﬀected by anticipated regret.
There are two sources of potential inconsistency, one is arrival of information and
the other is changing opportunities. First, we go over the general method of resolution
of potential inconsistency, by taking any kinds of inconsistency as given constraints.
Second, we characterize a class of choice dispositions that are consistent to information
arrival but may be inconsistent to changing opportunities. Finally, we consider the full
requirement of dynamic consistency and show that it necessarily implies independence
of choice opportunities.
¤This is a substantial revision of the paper previously circulated as ‘Dynamic choice with anticipated
regret.’ I thank conference/seminar participants at RUD 2006, ES-NASM 2008, Texas A&M and Yokohama
National University for helpful comments. Part of this work was done during my visit to the Institute of
Economic Research, Kyoto University. I gratefully appreciate their hospitality. All errors are mine.
11 Introduction
1.1 Dynamic consistency
The analysis of dynamic choice normally assumes that the decision maker has a ‘unity’ of
personality. The decision maker’s life path is typically described as a solution to certain
planning problem, in which the candidate life plans are evaluated according to the viewpoint
of his ‘initial self.’ The unity is required, since otherwise the life plan prescribed by the
initial self may not be followed by ‘himselves’ in the future, and the analysis based on such
planning solution is misleading.
Thus an analyst needs to go through checking so-called dynamic consistency condi-
tion: consider that the successive selves associated with diﬀerent date-events are diﬀerent
potentially, and check that nevertheless they have no disagreement about a desirable life
plan.
Dynamic consistency imposes that the sequence of choice dispositions of the decision
maker’s successive selves has to be connected across date-events in a recursive manner. In
choice under subjective uncertainty, it is known to require that beliefs at diﬀerent date-
events should be connected by means of Bayesian updating or its generalized version (Ep-
stein and Le Breton [7], Ghirardato [9], Epstein and Schneider [8]).
1.2 Dependence on contexts
On the other hand, in the static choice literature, various empirical studies ﬁnd that choice
not only depends on payoﬀ-relevant information but also signiﬁcantly on contexts. Among
many others, one can raise: dependence of risk attitudes on a status quo point and many
other kinds of framing eﬀects found by Kahneman and Tversky [19]; endowment eﬀect
found by Thaler [43]; extremeness aversion found by Simonson and Tversky [37], that con-
sumers tend to choose alternatives that are placed physically in the the middle, apart from
preferential values; naive diversiﬁcation found by Benartzi and Thaler [2], that investors
tend to split portfolios equally between available assets, apart from their return distribu-
tions; violation of transitivity of choice found by Loomes, Starmer and Sugden [25] in the
setting of choices between bets, which they explain by fear of ex-post regret.
These ﬁndings motivate various descriptive theories of context dependent choice such as
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky [19]), the theories of reference dependent choices
(Masatlioglu and Ok [28], Rubinstein and Salant [32]), the theory of choice from lists
(Rubinstein and Salant [31]) and the theories of anticipated regret (Loomes and Sugden
2[26], Sugden [42], Hayashi [17]).
Also, we see a normative thought behind the use of context dependent choice rules in
practice that choice rather should depend on contexts in order to utilize richer information
they possess. In the statistical decision making literature for example, minimax regret
(Savage [33, 34]) is frequently used. As explained later, minimax regret, as well as other
models of anticipated regret in general, is sensitive to the presence of salient unchosen
alternatives, in particular which are optimal at some states if one could choose at the
hindsight of that. The basis of using such rule will be attributed to the view that one
should worry about being ‘wrong,’ and be ‘pessimistic’ about the wrongness. Here what is
‘correct’ and what is ‘wrong’ are determined by ex-post optimal choices, that is, an action
is correct at some state if it is optimal there, and wrong at some state if it is not optimal
there. Such notions depend on what are available to choose — the decision maker cannot
worry about being wrong when he does not choose what he cannot choose.
To understand, imagine a choice problem in which the set of state contingent payoﬀs
is a segment spanned by (0;0) and (a;¡b), where the ﬁrst coordinate is about state 1 and
the second is about state 2, and a;b > 0. The maximin principle prescribes to choose (0;0)
even when b is very small, which is safe but severely wrong at state 1 when a is very large.
In practical problems, this often leads to the prescription that one should not do anything.
The Bayesian method prescribes either of the two endpoints in almost all cases, but it can
be severely wrong at either state. An intermediate model of uncertainty aversion (such as
multiple-prior model or second-order Bayesian model) can pick an intermediate point, but
it still does not take the notion of correctness or wrongness into account, which is seen
when one extends the right endpoint (a;¡b) to, say, (2a;¡2b): if the rule prescribes an
intermediate point in the current situation, it does not move after extending the endpoint,
but now in the new situation the current choice is more severely wrong at state 1. One can
make a similar argument for the case that the choice opportunity shrinks. The minimax











yields regret anticipated with regard to each state, which is the measure of
wrongness; the anticipated regret is a¡x at state 1 and b
ax at state 2; be pessimistic in the
sense that one should worry about the maximal anticipated regret; minimize the maximal
regret, which is in the current case obtained by equating a ¡ x and b
ax.
The idea of allowing choice to depend on opportunities is often adopted in the social
choice literature as well, particularly in the literature of cooperative bargaining (see for
3example Kalai and Smorodinsky [20], Chun [4]).1
These arguments, descriptive and normative, bring up a problem to the dynamic analysis
side. As date-event information evolves, that is, as time proceeds and uncertainty resolves
over time, contexts evolve and change as well accordingly, and that might aﬀect future
choice as well. The problem is even more serious, because the change of contexts in the
future may be caused endogenously by the current choice, whereas the evolution of time
and uncertainty is exogenous. Can dependence on contexts be compatible with dynamic
consistency? It is not diﬃcult to imagine that context dependence has a potential conﬂict
with dynamic consistency (since dependence in general involves more variables), but is that
a necessity?
To be more to the point, the current paper focuses on a case of ‘minimal’ context
dependence, the opportunity dependence due to being driven by anticipated regret — the
decision maker worries about being wrong, that is, being inferior to ex-post optimum.
As choice opportunity varies, ex-post optimal actions change. Hence choice depends on
the presence of salient alternatives which may not be chosen but are ex-post optimal at
some states. This suggests that eliminating alternatives at some stage may change how to
choose from remaining ones.
It is a ‘minimal’ departure in the following senses.
1. No cognitive/epistemic bias or irrationality: The decision maker is fully aware of
all the payoﬀ-relevant factors, able to calculate the consequence of every action per-
fectly in the form of a Savage act. He has perfect recall, and correctly perceives and
understands arriving information.
2. No extrinsic framing factors: We are not attributing dynamic inconsistencies to ex-
trinsic framing factors. Certain kinds of extrinsic framing factors that change over
time may cause inconsistency, and it may be even necessary, but let us leave it aside
here.
1The view that one should allow such dependence on opportunities is criticized by Chernoﬀ [3]. He
argues that the dependence leads to inconsistency, in the sense that the ﬁnal choice is not robust to the
order of how one eliminates alternatives in the meantime. He proposes a static consistency axiom based on
this argument, while the dynamic nature of the underlying elimination processes is taken to be implicit. The
current paper relates to Chernoﬀ’s concern in the way that we consider an extended setting that explicitly
treats the processes of eliminating alternatives together with the evolution of time and uncertainty.
43. Payoﬀ-based: No naive diversiﬁcation or naive extremeness aversion, in which the
decision maker tends to choose something that is placed physically in the middle of
the given set of alternatives.
4. No changing tastes, no present bias, no habit formation, no preference for intertem-
poral variety.
5. No dynamic inconsistency issue due to non-expected utility preferences: We maintain
that choice over objective (and reduced) lotteries follows the standard expected utility
theory a la von-Neumann and Morgenstern.
6. Consequentialism maintained: We still maintain the assumption that the decision
maker looks only at future, and does not care about what might have occurred at
unrealized events, what he did or could have done before. We allow dependence
on contexts about what are available, but we exclude dependence on what were
available.2
Although it is minimal, it has a necessary conﬂict with dynamic consistency, as we show
later.
1.3 What does dynamic consistency mean, by the way?
We are going to consider changing contexts/opportunities as the additional source of in-
consistency, as well as the well-known one, arrival of information. This requires us to be
much clearer about what logical process we are going through when we are checking the
dynamic consistency condition. The point below has to be made clear.
Dynamic consistency is a requirement that the decision maker’s selves associated
with diﬀerent decision nodes (including both date-events and contexts/opportunities)
should agree over the prescription of a commitment life plan, where those selves’
2We are aware that potential dynamic inconsistency might be rather saved by incorporating a non-
consequentialist viewpoint. Allowing non-consequentialism can be seen as making the updating procedure
depend on ‘dynamic contexts.’ In the present paper, we are treating a process of choice dispositions which
allows dependence on static contexts at each date-event. Taking dynamic contexts into account broadens the
possibility of dynamic consistency since the variety generated by contexts is given to the side of consistency
deﬁnition, whereas having a sequential dependence on static contexts may in general conﬂict with dynamic
consistency. See for example Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [15, 16], who take the non-consequentialist approach for
the inconsistency problem due to information arrival. Let us leave the above point aside as an orthogonal
issue, though.
5prescriptions are collected hypothetically. To check consistency, each self has to
be asked hypothetically to prescribe a commitment plan that starts from his
node, as if he is given a full discretion to govern the future course of actions.
That is, we have to ask each self, “if the plan starts from you and if you can
and have to make perfect commitment, and if this is the set of available plans,
which plan would you pick?”
Such collection of prescriptions is possible or conceivable only in a hypothetical
manner, because, if a self at some point really makes a choice with perfect
commitment, there is no choice problem left to the subsequent selves any longer.
This hypothetical exercise is necessary, however. If we are given just a real path
of actions, it is vacuously consistent.3
To understand, forget about uncertainty for a moment and consider a deterministic
two-period setting in which only the ﬁnal consumption at the end of period 2 matters. At
period 1, the decision maker is asked, “which one out of x and y would you pick?” To check
dynamic consistency, we have to ask him the same question at period 2, “which one out of
x and y would you pick?” If they disagree, this decision maker is dynamically inconsistent.
To see the satisfaction of dynamic consistency, we have to see that these two selves agree
for all such sequences of questions.
We must be more precise. The questions above should be more precisely stated as
Question to the period-1 self: “Which one out of x and y would you pick, if the
choice is ﬁnal?”
Question to the period-2 self: “Which one out of x and y would you pick, if the
choice is ﬁnal?”
Now we can see that we cannot have such a sequence of questions when real choice is
involved, because, if this decision maker really takes an action according to the answer
to the ﬁrst question, there is no choice problem left about which we can ask the second
question. Thus, the concept of dynamic consistency presumes ‘perfect commitment at
every possible decision node,’ which is an oxymoron and makes sense only in a hypothetical
manner.
3This point might apply to the static notion of choice consistency as well, though in the static argument
certain kind of ‘repeated statics’ or repeated static experiment is accepted to work.
61.4 The conﬂict between opportunity dependence and dynamic consis-
tency
Choice driven by anticipated regret is opportunity dependent, in the sense that choice is
aﬀected by the presence of unchosen alternatives. In other words, what is chosen from a
larger set may not be chosen from a smaller set containing it. This has a potential conﬂict
with dynamic consistency, because eliminating some alternatives at some stage may change
how the decision maker chooses from the remaining ones in the subsequent stages.
Is such conﬂict a necessity? Our answer is Yes. In this subsection we explain its intuition
by means of examples, in which the decision maker is assumed to follow Savage’s minimax
regret at every decision node. The use of minimax regret might sound too extreme, but here
we use it simply because it is the most familiar model of anticipated regret, and facilitates
to convey what kind of consistency we are talking about. We are not basing the argument
on an extreme case.
In the later part of the paper, we show that the inconsistency as explained in the
examples below entails in any model that allows dependence on opportunities, not only in
particular models of anticipated regret. In our Lemma 2 provided in Section 6, it is shown
that the satisfaction of full dynamic consistency indeed requires that we cannot have any
minor dependence on opportunity. Thus the conﬂict is a necessity.
Now we proceed to the examples.
Example 1 To focus on the source of inconsistency, assume that no information is provided
at period 0 and 1, and the whole uncertainty resolves at period 2, and also assume that the
decision maker cares only about the consumption at the ﬁnal period. Thus, inconsistency
problems related to discounting and updating are absent, and inconsistency if any can arise
only from changing opportunities.
For the simplicity purpose explained above, assume that the decision maker follows
Savage’s minimax regret at each period.





If the decision maker chooses from ff;g;hg at period 0 with perfect commitment, she
follows the table below,
7Income Regret Max Regret
s1 s2 s1 s2
f 2 2 2 3 3
g 4 1 0 4 4
h ¡1 5 5 0 5
Best 4 5
which leads to the choice f.
On the other hand, if the decision maker at period 1 is to choose from ff;gg with perfect
commitment (since there is no choice problem at period 2, it is naturally a commitment
problem), she follows
Income Regret Max Regret
s1 s2 s1 s2
f 2 2 2 0 2
g 4 1 0 1 1
Best 4 2
which leads to the choice g. Thus, period-0 self and period-1 self disagree on the commit-
ment life path, and this disagreement is due to the diﬀerence of choice opportunities.
Why is it a problem? What is the real choice problem in which the above disagreement
bites? Consider that the real choice problem at period 0 is between two choice opportunities
to carry over, ff;gg and fhg, which lacks perfect commitment. If the period-0 self takes
that he can govern his future behavior, he chooses ff;gg because he wants f. However,
this is not fulﬁlled because the period-1 self picks g when ff;gg is given.
Thus a dynamic inconsistency problem pops up, in the sense that under the lack of
commitment an ex-ante plan chosen by the current decision maker may not be followed by
himself in the future. This is due to the opportunity dependence, such that discarding h
at period 0 changes how one chooses from ff;gg at period 1.
Next example explains how opportunity dependence conﬂicts with dynamic consistency
when both arrival of information and changing opportunity proceed together over time.
Example 2 An investor is holding a stock. No new information is provided at period 0.
At period 1, either H1 or L1 realizes. At period 2, either H2 or L2 realizes.
At period 1, the stock price goes up by 5 if H1 realizes and falls by 7 if L1 realizes. At
period 2, if the shock at period 1 is H1 , the price goes up by 14 if H2 realizes and falls by
84 if L2 realizes; if the period-1 shock is L1, the price goes up by 11 if H2 realizes and falls
by 9 if L2 realizes.
The problem is when to sell the stock, where he has to sell it at period 2 anyway. Once
he sells, payoﬀ is ﬁnalized. Normalize the net gain of selling it at period 0 to 0.4
Let for example ‘Hold, (Hold if H1, Hold if L1)’ refer to the plan that he holds the stock
at period 0 and continues to hold it if H1 realizes at period 1 and continues to hold also
if L1 realizes, and similarly for other plans. Then we can write down the corresponding
Savage acts as below.
(H1;H2) (H1;L2) (L1;H2) (L1;L2)
Hold, (Hold if H1, Hold if L1) 19 1 4 ¡16
Hold, (Hold if H1, Sell if L1) 19 1 ¡7 ¡7
Hold, (Sell if H1, Hold if L1) 5 5 4 ¡16
Hold, (Sell if H1, Sell if L1) 5 5 ¡7 ¡7
Sell 0 0 0 0
Again for simplicity assume that the investor follows Savage’s minimax regret at each
decision node. If he chooses a plan presuming that he can exercise perfect commitment,
he picks ‘Hold, (Hold if H1, Sell if L1).’ However, if he holds the stock and L1 realizes at




There are two changes. One is the realization of L1. Since we are maintaining consequen-
tialism, the left two columns in the ﬁrst table, the payoﬀs contingent on H1, are excluded
from consideration. The other is that the choice option of selling at period 0 is gone. Since
we are maintaining consequentialism also in the sense that past choice opportunities do not
matter, we exclude the bottom row in the ﬁrst table from consideration. In the updated
problem at period 1, the investor following Savage’s minimax regret chooses Hold, which is
against the plan prescribed by the initial self.
4Since the model is about anticipated regret, it does not question whether the investor indeed monitors
the price movement after making choice. However, it is easier to understand the example if one takes that
the price movement is publicly observable and the investor monitors it even after selling.
91.5 Consistency vs. resolution
Here we need to clearly state the distinction between the requirement of dynamic consis-
tency and the resolution of possible inconsistencies.5
As we already discussed, for the argument we need to consider a sequence of preferences
or choice functions associated with diﬀerent decision nodes, each of which prescribes which
commitment life plan is desirable to follow from the viewpoint of the corresponding node.
Dynamic consistency is a requirement that there should be no disagreement between these
prescriptions, or that one should make such sequence so that there is no disagreement in
the beginning.
On the other hand, resolution is about how to determine the behavior, taking any
possible disagreement as a given constraint.
They are in the relation of mutual trade-oﬀs. When the sequence of prescriptions is
dynamically consistent, there is no role for resolution. Also, at least logically, having more
sources of inconsistency requires more tasks about resolution.6 In this paper, we consider
three scenarios.
1. Resolution without any consistency (Section 4)
2. Some consistency, leaving some necessity of resolution (Section 5)
3. Full satisfaction of consistency, leaving no necessity of resolution (Section 6)
In Section 4, we go over a general description of resolution, in which we allow any
kind of inconsistency and do not question whether the inconsistency is due to arrival of
information or due to changing opportunities. There we impose a well-known requirement,
sophistication, which says that the decision maker at the current node is fully self-aware
of potential inconsistencies and correctly foresees how his future selves will behave. The
sophistication axiom characterizes the backward induction behavior.
Resolution itself does not require or use any unity of personality. Future selves here can
be, as it were, totally diﬀerent persons from the current self. They can be simply somebody
else, whom the current self knows very well about. We do think the decision maker has
5Some authors refer to resolution as ‘consistent planning,’ but we take the current terminology so as to
make the distinction clearer.
6This does not exclude the possibility that having several kinds of inconsistencies together turns out to
make the life rather easier as a coincidence. In fact, this can happen in particular kinds of problems. In
the companion paper, Hayashi [18] shows in a stopping problem that the resolution becomes rather simpler
when the decision maker follows minimax regret with multiple-priors, where the belief process follows so
called "-contamination which is not consistent.
10some level of unity, though it may not be perfect. This motivates the material in Section
5.
What’s the merit of considering ‘some’ consistency? There are several dimensions about
consistency and inconsistency. For example, one may be consistent in the dimension of
knowledge but may be inconsistent in the dimension of will or self-governance.7 Another
may be consistent to changing contexts/opportunities but may be inconsistent to informa-
tion arrival. As we will see in Section 6, the full satisfaction of dynamic consistency requires
consistency in essentially all the dimensions. Should we then say that ‘some’ consistency is
meaningless if it is not perfect?
Our view is that some (or maybe each) dimension of consistency has an independent
merit to look at, even though it alone does not fulﬁll perfect consistency, and also that there
may be another dimension in which the decision maker is signiﬁcantly inconsistent despite
of consistency in the ﬁrst dimension. In particular, we view that we can and we should be
able to talk about consistency to information arrival, even when it alone does not achieve
the full requirement of dynamic consistency. In fact, it is what the existing arguments are
pursuing and imposing when there is no inconsistency due to opportunity dependence.
In Section 5, we formulate this idea in the form of the Consistency to Information
Arrival (CIA) axiom. It coincides with the standard deﬁnition of dynamic consistency
when information arrival is the only source of inconsistency, but it is only a part of the full
requirement of dynamic consistency when opportunity dependence has a role. The CIA
axiom limits attention to the cases that information arrives but choice opportunity remains
the same (after conditioning). Since choice opportunity remains the same, opportunity
dependence has no role to play there and the only possible inconsistency there is about
arrival of information. The CIA axiom states that there should be no choice reversal in
such situations.
The CIA axiom thus involves hypothetical comparison of choices, where the choice prob-
lems compared cannot be connected by means of real actions, since real action necessarily
changes future choice opportunities. However, as we discussed above and will do in Section
5 as well, this hypothetical exercise is necessary, and it is exactly what all the existing
notions of dynamic consistency are presuming. We are just making it clear on a larger
canvas.
The existing notions of dynamic consistency, most of which limit attention to informa-
7This is typically the case in the literature of self-control problem (see Strotz [41], Phelps and Pollak [30]
and Laibson [24]).
11tion arrival as the only source of inconsistency, ignore the potential inconsistency due to
opportunity dependence. There, consistency to information arrival alone guarantees the
full satisfaction of dynamic consistency. Here it does not, though as we claim above it has
a merit to look at by itself. Therefore the full requirement of dynamic consistency here has
to consider endogenous change of future choice opportunity as well. It is what we do in
Section 6. Not surprisingly, we obtain a ‘folk theorem,’ that the full satisfaction of dynamic
consistency necessarily implies independence of choice opportunities.
1.6 Related literature
Hammond [14] considers dynamic decision making under certainty, and shows the folk
theorem there.8 To see how, consider an opportunity-dependent decision maker who chooses
a from fa;b;cg but chooses b from fa;bg, where such dependence is for simplicity taken to
be the same across periods. Notice that they are the responses in which perfect commitment
is presumed. Now consider a real problem that at period 0 he chooses between two choice
opportunities to carry over, fa;bg and fcg, and at period 1 he makes ﬁnal choice. If the
period-0 self takes that he can govern the future behavior, he chooses fa;bg because he
wants a out of fa;bg [ fcg = fa;b;cg. However, this is not fulﬁlled because the period-1
self picks b when fa;bg is given. In section 6, we conﬁrm that the folk theorem holds even
when arrival of information and changing opportunities interact over time.
In the setting of objective risk, Machina [27] considers a sequence of preferences in-
dexed by time, that are deﬁned over commitment lotteries. He argues that there is a
necessary conﬂict between dynamic consistency and weakening the independence axiom a
la von-Neumann/Morgenstern, as far as the consequentialist view and the assumption of
reduction of compound lotteries are maintained. One way to achieve both maintaining
dynamic consistency and allowing non-expected utility preferences is to drop the reduction
assumption, which in other words says that the decision maker may care about the timing
of resolution of risk (see for example Kreps and Porteus [23]). Another way is to incorpo-
rate a non-consequentialist viewpoint, while maintaining the reduction assumption. Segal
[35] allows anchoring the updated preference on the lottery that was ‘chosen’ to be optimal
in the previous stage, and provides a sequence of dynamically consistent preferences that
do not boil down to the expected utility model. As already mentioned, we assume that
8More precisely, opportunity independence here refers to the contraction property by Chernoﬀ [3]. Also,
the folk theorem argument already appears in Chernoﬀ’s paper as a motivation for the contraction property.
12choice over objective outcomes follows the standard expected utility theory, and leave this
problem aside as an orthogonal issue.
In the setting of subjective uncertainty, Epstein and Le Breton [7] consider a process
of preferences over commitment random variables, in which preference at each date-event
is complete and transitive (see also Ghirardato [9]). Thus, the only potential source of
dynamic inconsistency there is arrival of information. They impose the consistency condi-
tion that preference reversal cannot occur after arrival of information. When the process
of preferences falls in the model of subjective expected utility (Savage [34]), the condition
implies that the corresponding process of beliefs follows Bayesian updating. Also, when the
condition is applied to variable events, it even implies the sure thing principle.
In the subjective uncertainty setting with a ﬁxed information structure, Epstein and
Schneider [8] consider a process of preferences that accommodate ambiguity aversion and
maintain dynamic consistency. They assume that the preference process falls in the model
of multiple-prior expected utility by Gilboa-Schmeidler [11], and show that the correspond-
ing process of multiple-prior beliefs has to satisfy so-called rectangularity, a generalization
of Bayesianity, so as to maintain dynamic consistency. Again, notice that arrival of infor-
mation is the only source of potential inconsistency there, and rectangularity is suﬃcient
for dynamic consistency as well.
Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [15, 16] generalize the deﬁnition of conditional preference so that
it depends not only on a realized event but also on the choice opportunity one ‘had’ in
the previous stage and what was ‘chosen’ to be optimal there. This weakens the standard
consequentialist viewpoint, that conditional preference should depend only on a given real-
ized event and should ignore everything outside of it. For this general class of conditional
preferences, they characterize a broader class of updating rules, that may or may not be
Bayesian or rectangular but satisfy dynamic consistency.
Siniscalchi [38] considers preference over decision trees, instead of commitment random
variables. Here a decision tree can be viewed as a random variable over choice problems
consisting of random variables over choice problems and so on, and it is an element of a
larger domain than that of commitment random variables. He allows an almost arbitrary
class of updating rules and types of uncertainty aversion, which allows potential dynamic
inconsistency due to arrival of information. In his setting, belief updating and determination
of behavior are mutually orthogonal issues, which is the case in our setting as well. It is
imposed there that the decision maker is sophisticated, in the same spirit of our resolution
notion, that he has a correct foresight about how his future selves will behave and takes it
13as given. Arrival of information is still the only source of dynamic inconsistency there, but
it makes choice opportunity matter in the sense that the decision maker has a signiﬁcant
preference for commitment: if the current self foresees that himself after knowing some
information rather makes a bad choice from his perspective, he rather prefers to make a
commitment rather than to leave a choice opportunity to his future self.
Finally, we mention a recent paper by Kr¨ ahmer and Stone [22], that considers a model of
dynamic choice under uncertainty in which the regret-driven decision maker plays backward
induction. Their model falls in our general model, and is close to its special case, the smooth
model of regret aversion. The diﬀerence is that we are aiming to characterize how regret is
anticipated in the dynamic setting, how dynamic inconsistency is resolved, and how beliefs
are updated, while Kr¨ ahmer-Stone start with the backward induction model with the notion
of ex-post regret and Bayesian updating, and aim to see its behavioral implications.
2 Setting
2.1 Information structure
Time is discrete and ﬁnite. It varies from 0 to T. Let Ω be a ﬁnite set of states of the
world. Information structure is ﬁxed, and it is given in the form of a sequence of partitions
fFtgT
t=0 as follows:






2. F0 = fΩg and FT = ff!g : ! 2 Ωg.
Given t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, let
Ft+1jEt = fEt+1 2 Ft+1 : Et+1 ½ Etg:
2.2 Hierarchical domain of choice problems
For simplicity, we assume that utility (or payoﬀ) of each possible ﬁnal outcome is given as a
real number and its range covers the entire real line R. It is justiﬁed by making certain ex-
post randomization argument following Anscombe and Aumann [1] and a suitable extension
of that.
14We consider a hierarchical domain of choice problems. An action taken in a given choice
problem results in a subsequent choice problem again, after one-step realization of uncer-
tainty. This is indeed how we formulate a dynamic choice problem in many applications.
Formally, the hierarchical domain of choice problems ((BEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 is deﬁned by
1. for each ET¡1 2 FT¡1,
BET¡1 = K(RET¡1)









where RS denotes the set of functions from a given set S to R, and K(X) denotes the set
of nonempty compacts subsets of a given metric space X.
2.3 Subdomain of choice problems over commitment plans
Also we consider a subdomain of ‘static’ choice problems. In this paper, we take it to be the
subdomain of choice problems where the decision maker has to make perfect commitment.
The subdomain of commitment choice problems at period t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 with event





When such a choice problem CEt 2 CEt is given and the decision maker chooses its
element fEt 2 CEt, she has to commit to this random variable (since fEt 2 REt) and there
is no choice afterward, hence the choice is essentially static.9 Thus an element of CEt is called
a commitment choice problem. With the slight abuse of notation, for each t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡1
and Et 2 Ft, we have ‘CEt ½ BEt.’ Since choice at period T ¡1 is necessarily ﬁnal, we have
CET¡1 = BET¡1 for every ET¡1 2 FT¡1.
9To be notationally rigorous, one has to write it with a layer of brackets like f¢¢¢fffEtggg and similarly
for the description of CEt. But we omit this when perfect commitment is imposed and when no confusion
arises.
152.4 Policy functions
In standard dynamic choice models, a sequence of preferences over commitment random
variables is taken to be the primitive, and a processes of policy functions is derived as a result
of optimization. In contrary, here we take a process of policy functions as the primitive of
the model. To allow possible multiplicity of choices, we consider a set of processes of policy
functions.
A process of policy functions ' = (('Et)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 is a sequence of functions, where




satisﬁes 'Et(BEt) 2 BEt for every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, Et 2 Ft and BEt 2 BEt. We call such
sequence a choice process. Let Φ denote a set of such choice processes. We call it a choice
process set.
In commitment choice problems at a given date-event, there is no distinction between a
choice process set and the family of sets of choices induced by that (choice correspondence
in other words). Thus, the correspondence of commitment choices that is induced by Φ is
given as follows: for each t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, given CEt 2 CEt, ΦEt(CEt) ½ REt
is deﬁned by
ΦEt(CEt) = f'Et(CEt) : ' 2 Φg:
3 Choice over commitment plans
We assume that the decision maker’s ‘self’ at each decision node gives choice prescription
about commitment plans, following a model of regret-based choice. Choice over commit-
ment plans is essentially static, hence we don’t go beyond borrowing a static choice model
from the literature and adapting it to the current setting. In the current paper we adopt
the static model by Hayashi [17], since (i) it includes Savage’s minimax regret as a special
case and includes a larger class of regret-driven choices; (ii) it includes subjective expected
utility maximization as a special case; (iii) it covers the intransitive preference model by
Loomes and Sugden [26] when applied to binary choices; (iv) it enables clearer treatment
of opportunity dependence since it is build on choice functions rather than preference re-
lations; (v) it is axiomatic and enables a clearer connection between dynamic consistency
and opportunity dependence.10
10See the related models and axiomatizations by by Milnor [29], Stoye [39, 40]
16Though, of course we would not insist that it is the only model that captures dependence
on opportunity due to being aﬀected by anticipated regret. We pick the current model just
because it is the most eﬃcient way to tackle the problem within our current scope.
Except for one thing, the adaptation is more or less straightforward, hence we avoid
repeating the whole axiomatization of it. The non-obvious thing is about the very deﬁnition
of anticipated regret. To see why, go back to Example 2. Consider that the investor at
period 0 is wondering about the case that he holds the asset and sees L1 at period 1.
Does he anticipate regretting to hold the asset at that point? It’s not clear, because if he
continues to hold further and sees H2 at period 2 then it is not regrettable. This suggests
that in order to describe one anticipated regret we may need to imagine and track one
whole path of uncertainty resolution and future actions.
Since there is no extra information presumed about how the decision maker limits
the scope about the imagination of ‘ex-post’ optimum, in the current adaptation we take
the widest scope as our default. That is, we require that the notion of ex-post optimum
is perceived with regard to terminal states. Formally, it is embodied by the following
dynamic adaptation of the deﬁnition of ex-post dominance. Given t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and
Et 2 Ft, consider two sets of commitment plans, CEt;DEt 2 CEt. Say that CEt ex-post
dominates DEt from the viewpoint of Et if for all ! 2 Et there exists fEt 2 CEt such
that fEt(!) ¸ gEt(!) for all gEt 2 DEt. This says that whatever states in Et realizes CEt
guarantees a better ex-post choice than DEt does. In other words, if one could choose at the
hindsight of terminal states, CEt is unambiguously better than DEt. Write the relationship
by CEt ¸EP
Et DEt.
The main axiom for the static model is that adding ex-post dominated acts to the
existing set of alternatives does not cause choice reversal, because it does not change what
is good ex-post. Below is its adaptation to the current setting.11
Irrelevance of Ex-post Dominated Acts: For every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡1 and Et 2 Ft, for
every CEt;DEt 2 CEt with CEt ¸EP
Et DEt,
ΦEt(CEt [ DEt) \ CEt 6= ; =) ΦEt(CEt [ DEt) \ CEt = ΦEt(CEt)
In contrary to the purely static model, there is a non-obvious choice of the dominance
relation that is used in the weakened independence axiom. For example, the current adap-
tation may not allow a notion of interim regret, in which the decision maker summarizes
11The idea originates from Milnor [29]. See also Stoye [39, 40] for a more sophisticated treatment of it.
17information about future uncertainty and actions into a ‘continuation value’ in the form of
a one-step-ahead measurable function and anticipates regret with regard to the realization
of one-step-ahead uncertainty.
The Irrelevance of Ex-post Dominated Acts axiom plus additional axioms characterize
the general model of regret-based choice below. The additional axioms are: (i) an ad-
missibility axiom, that an alternative should not be chosen if there is another available
alternative that is ex-post better at every terminal state; (ii) an independence axiom with
regard to ex-post mixture (randomization a la Anscombe-Aumann) of outcomes between
sets and singleton sets; and (iii) upper hemi-continuity, a mild technical axiom.
Given t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, a function ΨEt : REt
+ ! R+ is said to be weakly
monotone if for every xEt;yEt 2 REt
+ , ΨEt(xEt) ¸ ΨEt(yEt) if xEt(!) ¸ yEt(!) for all
! 2 Et, and ΨEt(xEt) > ΨEt(yEt) additionally if xEt(!) > yEt(!) for all ! 2 Et with
xEt(!) > 0.
General model of regret-based choice: Given a list of weakly monotone and homo-
thetic functions ((ΨEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 , for each t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, it holds
that










for every CEt 2 CEt.
Here the function ΨEt given Et explains how the decision maker there aggregates regret
anticipated with regard to terminal states. Let us call it regret-aggregating function. There
are two aspects explained by the function, one is belief about states and the other is how
one is pessimistic about anticipated inferiority to ex-post optimum.
The general model has two notable special cases. One is minimax regret with multiple-
priors, which is a generalization of Savage’s minimax regret. Here the set of priors is to
explain two diﬀerent roles, belief itself and attitude toward anticipated regret, which is
typically the case in other diﬀerent types of use of multiple-priors as well (see for example
Ghirardato and Marinacci [10]).
Given t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, let ∆(Et) denote the set of probability measures
over Et.
Subclass 1 (Minimax regret with multiple-priors): Given a list of closed convex sets
((PEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 , for each t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡1 and Et 2 Ft, it holds that PEt\int∆(Et) 6=
18; and












for every CEt 2 CEt.
This includes Savage’s minimax regret as a special case that PEt = ∆(Et) for all t =
0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft. Also, it includes subjective expected maximization as a special
case that PEt is a singleton for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft.
The second notable special case is the smooth model of anticipated regret, in which
the decision maker holds a probabilistic belief but distorts anticipated regret before taking
expectation. Here the distortion parameter explains how one is averse to the anticipated
inferiority to ex-post optimum, which we call regret aversion parameter.
Subclass 2 (Smooth model of anticipated regret): Given a list of probability
measures ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 and a list of positive numbers ((®Et)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 , for each
t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, it holds that pEt 2 int∆(Et) and










for every CEt 2 CEt.
This includes subjective expected utility maximization as a special case that ®Et = 1 for
all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft. Also, it covers Savage’s minimax regret as a limit case
that ®Et ! 1 for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft.
4 Resolution without consistency
First, we go over the general problem of how the decision maker behaves in non-commitment
situations, without assuming any ‘unity’ of personality, by taking any possible dynamic
inconsistencies as a given constraint.
The model of choice over commitment plans described in the previous section allows
two kinds of potential inconsistency, which may pop up in the non-commitment situations.
One is due to arrival of new information. Since we have not speciﬁed any belief updating
rule yet, arrival of information has a potential to cause inconsistency. The other is due
to opportunity dependence, which is discussed in the introduction. Here we consider how
to make a sophisticated choice, in the presence of any of these two kinds of inconsistency,
19without making any distinction between them. The argument of sophistication here is quite
well-known, since it appears in many models of dynamic inconsistency. Hence we obviously
do not claim novelty about it, but we contain it for completeness.
Given ' 2 Φ, deﬁne the continuation path resulting from ‘one time deviation’ aEt 2
BEt 2 BEt at period t with event Et as follows : deﬁne a commitment random variable
hEt(';aEt) 2 REt by
hEt(';aEt)(!) = 'ET¡1(¢¢¢'Et+1(aEt(Et+1))(ET¡1))(!)
for each ! 2 Ω, where Et+1;¢¢¢ ;ET¡1 is the sequence of events which follow Et and include
!.
Given BEt 2 BEt and ', deﬁne the reduced problem with commitment, denoted BEt(') 2
CEt, by
BEt(') = fhEt(';aEt) : aEt 2 BEtg;
which consists of the commitment variables generated as above.
We impose an axiom that any chosen action must be chosen also in the reduced problem,
and vice versa.
Axiom S (Sophistication): ' 2 Φ if and only if for every BEt 2 BEt,
hEt(';'Et(BEt)) 2 ΦEt(BEt(')):
Under the lack of commitment, the decision maker at period t takes it into account how his
future selves will behave, which is described by (('E¿)E¿2F¿)T¡1
¿=t+1. Given this foresight,
he computes the consequence of his current action aEt, which is described by means of the
commitment random variable hEt(';aEt). The current decision maker takes each possible
continuation path to be a commitment random variable. Given that, he makes choice as if
he is facing a commitment problem, in which once he takes an action the successive selves
start acting like automatic machines that he cannot control at all. The axiom says that
such way of making choice has to coincide with how he behaves indeed.
The substantive assumption behind it is that the current decision maker has no power
to control or govern his future choices, and has to take future selves’ behaviors as given.
That is, the future selves can be treated as if they are totally diﬀerent persons. The decision
maker modeled like this looks somewhat schizophrenic, but we adopt it as a step toward
explicitly treating how intrapersonal conﬂicts and tensions are resolved. One might consider
20cases that the decision maker has incomplete but some amount of power to govern his future
behaviors, or that he mistakenly believes he can do so, but it is beyond the current scope.12
Here we state the consequence of the sophistication axiom.
Theorem 1 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation as in the basic
model. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom S.
(b) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes that ' 2 Φ if and only if










for every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, Et 2 Ft and BEt 2 BEt.
Proof. Since (b) =) (a) is routine, we prove (a) =) (b).
‘Only if’ part: Suppose ' 2 Φ and take any BEt 2 BEt. By Sophistication, hEt(';'Et(BEt)) 2
ΦEt(BEt(')). By deﬁnition of BEt('),























which is equivalent to












12There is another approach, that treats resolution of intrapersonal conﬂicts in an ‘implicit’ manner (see
for example Gul and Pesendorfer [12, 13], Epstein [6]). It is done by looking at preference over menus, while
choice from a given menu is left unspeciﬁed or assumed to follow preference over singleton menus eventually.
It attempts to describe how one deals with his intrapersonal conﬂicts through analyzing nontrivial preference
for ﬂexibility or commitment. Such description is obtained as a part of the representation of preference,
where the ranking between menus is explained as if the decision maker is assigning certain weights between
conﬂicting dispositions within him.
The implicit approach allows the use of dynamic programming when extended to a hierarchical domain
of menus, in which dynamic consistency does not seem to be a problem. However, this is because looking
at preference over menus (value function or indirect utility, in other words) in the beginning presumes that
intrapersonal conﬂict if any has been already resolved in some way, and it limits analysis to what kind of
conﬂict can explain the observed non-standard features of the menu preference.
21Corollary 1 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Sublass 1.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom S.
(b) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes that ' 2 Φ if and only if












for every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, Et 2 Ft and BEt 2 BEt.
Corollary 2 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Sublass 2.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom S.
(b) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes that ' 2 Φ if and only if










for every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, Et 2 Ft and BEt 2 BEt.
5 Some unity: consistency to information arrival
The resolution of dynamic inconsistency discussed in the previous section allows that the
decision maker’s future self can be a totally diﬀerent personality than the current self.
Also, it does not question whether inconsistency comes from arrival of information or from
changing choice opportunities.
In this section, we investigate under which condition the decision maker still has certain
level of unity as an individual, in terms of consistency to information arrival. That is we
rule out one of the two types of inconsistency, the inconsistency due to arrival of infor-
mation, which delivers consistent connections of beliefs and uncertainty (regret) attitudes
across date-events. Notice that such decision maker still may have the inconsistency due
to opportunity dependence.
To see in what sense one is consistent to information arrival, compare two choice prob-
lems: (a) a commitment choice problem at a given node; (b) a commitment choice problem
at any given node in the next period, which consists of conditional revision of all the acts in
(a) upon the realization of one-step-ahead uncertainty. There is no change of opportunity
between (a) and (b). Hence the inconsistency due to opportunity dependence is absent,
and the only possible inconsistency is about the arrival of information. Our consistency to
information arrival condition states that there is no choice reversal between (a) and (b).
22In the existing studies of choice under uncertainty in which independence of choice op-
portunity is assumed and arrival of information is the only source of possible inconsistency,
the above condition alone is necessary and suﬃcient for the full satisfaction of dynamic con-
sistency. However, in the current case in which choice is opportunity dependent, the above
condition is necessary but not suﬃcient for the full satisfaction, and it has an implication
only about how beliefs and uncertainty attitudes evolve over time.
The consistency to information arrival requirement is stated as
Axiom CIA (Consistency to Information Arrival): For every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2,











Notice that axiom CIA is not about a real course of actions. In reality, making some action
necessarily changes choice opportunity in the future. Therefore, the consistency to infor-
mation arrival requirement has to be about hypothetical connection between commitment
choice problems at diﬀerent periods that may not be connected by means of real actions.
Hypothetical exercise is necessary
The hypothetical connection stated above might sound absurd as it says. However, it is
exactly what all the existing arguments about dynamic consistency are presuming. All
the existing models of dynamic choice either under certainty or uncertainty13 presume
that the analyst can see the comparison across decision nodes about the rankings between
all the pairs of alternatives (consumption streams, random variables, random consumption
streams, etc.), by seeing as if all the alternatives are available throughout the lifetime (after
conditioning on date-event) and the decision maker can exercise ‘perfect commitment at
each decision node,’ which cannot be true along the real course of actions.14
To see this, consider the standard dynamic consistency requirement in the model of
preference process, with regard to arrival of information: for all t, Et 2 Ft and Et+1 2
Ft+1jEt, for all fEt+1;gEt+1 2 REt+1 and hEtnEt+1 2 REtnEt+1,
fEt+1 %Et+1 gEt+1 if and only if (fEt+1;hEtnEt+1) %Et (gEt+1;hEtnEt+1)
13such as Koopmans [21], Epstein [5], Machina [27], Kreps and Porteus [23], Epstein and Le Breton [7],
Ghirardato [9], Epstein and Schneider [8]
14An explicit dynamic consistency axiom does not appear in Koopmans [21] and Epstein [5], but they
essentially assume that preference over future consumption paths is identical over time, and impose the
stationarity axiom as the dynamic consistency requirement.
23where %Et refers to the period-t/event-Et preference over commitment random variables
that are conditional on Et, and %Et+1 refers to the period-t + 1/event-Et+1 preference
over commitment random variables that are conditional on Et+1. As formal objects, the
acts appeared above are commitment random variables. The relation (fEt+1;hEtnEt+1) ÂEt
(gEt+1;hEtnEt+1) says ‘if the decision maker at period-t/event-Et chooses between (fEt+1;hEtnEt+1)
and (gEt+1;hEtnEt+1) when perfect commitment is imposed, he chooses (fEt+1;hEtnEt+1).’
Hence, if he really makes choice in such a manner, there is no choice problem left at any
subsequent date/event: if he really chooses (fEt+1;hEtnEt+1) over (gEt+1;hEtnEt+1) at period-
t/event-Et with perfect commitment, he cannot have the choice problem between fEt+1 and
gEt+1 at period-t + 1/event-Et+1.
In the choice function framework, the above form of dynamic consistency condition is
written as





which is exactly our CIA axiom applied to the above binary choices.
When arrival of information is the only source of potential inconsistency, Consistency
to Information Arrival alone guarantees the full satisfaction of dynamic consistency (the
full requirement that should be stated in our extended setting comes in the next section).
It is exactly what the existing arguments are imposing.
The axiom CIA is supposed to operate in a hypothetical universe of choice problems
that are connected at diﬀerent periods hypothetically, not by means of real actions. But
this point applies to all the existing deﬁnitions of dynamic consistency.
Consistency to Information Arrival imposes that the regret-aggregating functions are
connected in a recursive manner.
Theorem 2 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation as in the basic
model. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom CIA.
(b) The choice process set Φ has the additional property that for every t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2,
Et 2 Ft and every xEt;yEt 2 REt
+ ,
ΨEt+1(xEt+1) = ΨEt+1(yEt+1) for every Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt
implies
ΨEt(xEt) = ΨEt(yEt)
24and the conclusion holds with strict inequality additionally if ΨEt+1(xEt+1) > ΨEt+1(yEt+1)
for some Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt, where xEt+1 denotes the restriction of xEt to Et+1.
Proof. (a) =) (b): For simplicity of the argument, we directly treat regret vectors
instead of payoﬀ vectors. Take any xEt;yEt 2 REt
+ such that ΨEt+1(xEt+1) = ΨEt+1(yEt+1)
for every Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt.
For each Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt, let CEt+1 2 R
Et+1
+ be any compact set with xEt+1;yEt+1 2
CEt+1 such that minzEt+12CEt+1 zEt+1(!) = 0 for all ! 2 Et+1 and ΨEt+1(yEt+1) = minzEt+12CEt+1 ΨEt+1(zEt+1).15
By construction, yEt+1 minimizes ΨEt+1 in CEt+1 for each Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt.
By CIA (½ direction), yEt is chosen from
∏
Et+12Ft+1jEt CEt+1 at period t with event
Et, which implies that yEt is minimizing ΨEt in
∏
Et+12Ft+1jEt CEt. Therefore, ΨEt(xEt) =
ΨEt(yEt).
Suppose additionally that ΨEt+1(xEt+1) > ΨEt+1(yEt+1) for some Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt. Then,
xEt+1 cannot be chosen from CEt+1.
By CIA (¾ direction), xEt cannot be chosen from
∏
Et+12Ft+1jEt CEt+1 at period t with




(b) =) (a): Obvious.
On the model of minimax regret with multiple-priors, Theorem 2 implies that the process
of multiple-priors follows a recursive relationship.
Deﬁnition 1 The list of sets ((PEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 is rectangular if for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2,
Et 2 Ft:




(pEt(Et+1)pEt+1)Et+12Ft+1jEt : pEt 2 PEt; pEt+1 2 PEt+1; Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt
}
:
Corollary 3 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Sublass 1.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom CIA.
(b) The choice process set Φ has the additional property that ((PEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 is rectangular.
Proof. (a) =) (b): Part (i) follows from Theorem 2. We prove (ii). Let
QEt =
{
(pEt(Et+1)pEt+1)Et+12Ft+1jEt : pEt 2 PEt; pEt+1 2 PEt+1; Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt
}
15It suﬃces to consider the case that such CEt is ﬁnite, though its cardinality needs to be at least jEtj+2
in general.










for every xEt 2 REt
+ .
Given xEt 2 REt









where Et+1 2 Ft+1jEt is taken so that ! 2 Et+1.



























where the right-hand-side is equal to maxqEt2QEt
∑
!2Et x(!)qEt(!).
(b) =) (a): Obvious.
On the smooth model of anticipated regret, Theorem 2 implies that the process of
beliefs follows Bayesian updating and the regret aversion parameters are constant across
date-events.
Corollary 4 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Sublass 2.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom CIA.
(b) The choice process set Φ has the additional property that
pEt = (pEt(Et+1)pEt+1)Et+12Ft+1jEt
for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2, Et 2 Ft, and
®Et = ® > 0
for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, Et 2 Ft.
26Proof. (a) =) (b): Fix any t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2, Et 2 Ft and Et+1 2 FtjEt. Consider
xEt;yEt 2 REt
+ , such that
xEt(!) = yEt(!) = 1 for all ! 2 Et n Et+1:








































Et (!)pEt(!jEt+1) agree on
the ranking over R
Et+1
+ . By the uniqueness of representation, ®Et = ®Et+1 and pEt(¢jEt+1) =
pEt+1(¢).
Since this is true for all Et+1 2 FtjEt, Et 2 Ft, t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, we obtain the desired
result.
(b) =) (a): Obvious.
6 Full dynamic consistency
The previous section discusses that belief consistency has an independent merit to look at,
but it alone does not fulﬁll dynamic consistency perfectly, since there is inconsistency due
to opportunity dependence. In this section we consider the implication of imposing full
dynamic consistency, which says there is no kind of disagreement between successive selves,
and leaves no necessity of resolution. Here it has to involve both arrival of information and
changing opportunity, while we talked only about the ﬁrst one in the previous section.
Given a general choice problem at period t in which commitment is not necessarily
presumed, consider two lists of commitment choice problems derived from it hypothetically:
(a) a commitment choice problem at period t, which is derived by giving the period-t self
a perfect power to control choices at all the subsequent periods; (b) a list of commitment
choice problems at period t + 1, that are derived from the original problem by postponing
choice at period t to each decision node at period t+1, in which the corresponding period-
t+1 self is given the power. The dynamic consistency condition basically states that there
is no reversal between (a) and (b).
27Again, the consistency requirement is about hypothetical connections between commit-
ment choice problems at diﬀerent decision nodes (which is an oxymoron), and and it is a
necessary argument to go through.












be the set of all the commitment random variables that are attained if the decision maker
at Et can exercise perfect commitment so as to control all future selves’ choices. Notice







Now the full dynamic consistency condition is stated as
























To understand DC-(i), consider hypothetically that the decision maker at time-t/event-Et
postpones choice and delegates it to himself at the next date-event. Upon each possible
realization of one-step-ahead uncertainty, the next-period self makes choice with perfect
commitment. Collect the list of such (anticipated) responses contingent on the realization
of one-step-ahead uncertainty. It is the left-hand-side of DC-(i). The right-hand-side of
DC-(i) is the commitment life plan which the current self picks if he can exercise perfect
commitment. Now DC-(i) says that if a commitment life plan is supported by all the selves
at all the events at the next period, it should be chosen by the current self as well when he
can exercise perfect commitment.
To understand DC-(ii), consider that the current self can make choice with perfect com-
mitment, assuming that he can perfectly govern his future actions. Consider a commitment
life plan chosen there. It is the left-hand-side of DC-(ii). Then, DC-(ii) says that there
28must be a corresponding real action at the current period that induces every self in the next
period to agree to the prescribed life plan, given each possible realization of one-step-ahead
uncertainty and delivery of new choice opportunity.
Lemma 1 DC implies CIA.




Next lemma is a kind of folk theorem. We conﬁrm that the full dynamic consistency
requirement implies opportunity independence in the sense that the sequence of choice
correspondences satisﬁes the contraction property except at the initial node.16 Notice that
this folk theorem itself is model-free — it holds in any model of dynamic choice under
uncertainty in which arrival of information and changing opportunities are the sources of
potential inconsistency, as far as the above-noted consequentialism is maintained.
Lemma 2 (Folk Theorem): DC implies that the sequence ((ΦEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 satisﬁes the
contraction property (Chernoﬀ [3]) at each node: for all t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft, for
all ﬁnite sets CEt;DEt 2 CEt with CEt ½ DEt,
ΦEt(DEt) \ CEt ½ ΦEt(CEt):
The claim extends to general compact sets when ((ΦEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 satisﬁes upper hemi-
continuity.
Proof. Fix any t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1 and Et 2 Ft. Pick any fEt 2 ΦEt(DEt) \ CEt. Suppose
fEt = 2 ΦEt(CEt).
Let Et¡1 2 Ft¡1 be such that Et¡1 ¾ Et. Let fh e Etg e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et be any list, where
h e Et 2 R














By assumption, we have
(fEt;fh e Etg e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et) 2 ΦEt(DEt) £
∏
e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et
Φ e Et(fh e Etg):
16Dynamic consistency does not have an implication with regard to the expansion property (Sen [36]),
because changing opportunity over time proceeds only in the direction of narrowing down.
29By DC-(i) applied to BEt¡1, we obtain
















e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et
fh e Etg; (DEt n CEt) £
∏





on the other hand. By assumption, we have




e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et





ΦEt(DEt n CEt) £
∏
e Et2FtjEt¡1; e Et6=Et
Φ e Et+1(fh e Etg)

:
By DC-(ii) applied to B0
Et¡1, we obtain









The basic model satisﬁes the contraction property over ﬁnite sets if and only if it obeys
subjective expected utility maximization.17 Combining this fact and Lemma 1, Lemma 2
and Theorem 2, we obtain
Theorem 3 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation as in the basic
model. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom DC.
(b) There exist a homothetic and strictly increasing function   Ψ0 : R
F1
+ ! R+ and a process
of full-support probability measures ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 such that





17In the static setting, Hayashi [17] shows that the general regret-based model satisﬁes the Nash-Arrow
type independence irrelevant alternatives condition if and only if it obeys subjective expected utility maxi-
mization. The same argument goes through with the contraction property applied just to ﬁnite sets, which
is a milder condition.
30for every CEt 2 CEt, Et 2 Ft, t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, and




















for every C0 2 C0. Moreover, ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 satisﬁes the property that
pEt = (pEt(Et+1)pEt+1)Et+12Ft+1jEt
for all t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2 and Et 2 Ft.
Remark 1 When F1 = F0, that is, when no information is revealed at period 1, the
period-0 choice reduces to the expected utility maximization as well, and there is no room
for opportunity dependence at all. This essentially says that full satisfaction of dynamic
consistency requires opportunity independence, since we can easily add an extra stage, say,
period 0:5, with no information revelation.
Remark 2 Epstein-Schneider [8] provides a class of intertemporal preferences that allows
uncertainty aversion but satisﬁes dynamic consistency. Our result does not contradict to
theirs. The regret-based model coincides with the model of uncertainty aversion such as
maximin expected utility (Gilboa-Schmeidler [11]) only when opportunity sets are sym-
metric in the sense that ex-post maximum values are equal across terminal states. On
the whole domain of choice problems, the only intersection between the two is subjective
expected utility maximization. In the regret-based model, subjective uncertainty plays a
role through causing a dependence on choice opportunities. It makes the decision maker
‘pessimistic’ about how to evaluate the inferiority to ex-post optimum, but here the notion
of pessimism is dependent on choice opportunity since the point of ex-post optimum is so.
This is a diﬀerent channel which is orthogonal to how subjective uncertainty plays a role
in the model of uncertainty aversion.
Thus, since dynamic consistency implies there is essentially no role for opportunity
dependence, it further implies there is no role for subjective uncertainty beyond subjective
expected utility maximization.
Proof. (a) =) (b): It follows from the combination of Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem
2.
(b) =) (a): It is easy to see that the choice correspondences at period 1 and after satisfy
DC since they obey subjective expected utility maximization with Bayesian updating. Thus
31we focus on the relation between period 0 and 1.
To check DC-(i), consider f0 2 C0(B0) such that for each E1 2 F1,







where fE1 denotes the restriction of f0 to E1.
Then it achieves

























for each E1 2 F1.
To check DC-(ii), let f0 2 Φ0(C0(B0)), that is,




















Then, there is a0 2 B0 such that f0 2
∏
E12F1 CE1(a0(E1)) achieves the minimum. Then,
it has to be the case that for each E1 2 F1, fE1 maximizes
∑
!2E1 fE1(!)pE1(!) in
CE1(a0(E1)), which results in f0 2
∏
E12F1 ΦE1(CE1(a0(E1))).




!2E1 fE1(!)pE1(!). Then, (hE1;(f e E1) e E12F1nfE1g) 2 C0(B0) and it obtains a smaller value
of   Ψ0, which is a contradiction to the assumption.
On the model of minimax regret with multiple-priors, the above result implies that the
multiplicity of beliefs is allowed only for the one-step-ahead uncertainty between period 0
and 1.
Corollary 5 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Subclass 1.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom DC.
(b) There exist a set of probability measures P0 ½ ∆(Ω) and a process of full-support
probability measures ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 such that





for every CEt 2 CEt, Et 2 Ft, t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 1, and


















32for every C0 2 C0. Moreover, P0 and ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=1 satisfy the property that p0(E1) > 0
for all E1 2 F1 and p0 2 P0, and
P0 = f(p0(E1)pE1)E12F1 : p0 2 P0g;
and
pEt = (pEt(Et+1)pEt+1)Et+12Ft+1jEt
for all t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2 and Et 2 Ft.
On the smooth model of anticipated regret, since Corollary 4 already delivers Bayesian
updating and constancy of regret attitudes across date-events, the folk theorem implies
expected utility maximization at every decision node.
Corollary 6 Assume that the choice process set Φ allows the representation Subclass 2.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) The choice process set Φ satisﬁes axiom DC.
(b) There exists a process of full-support probability measures ((pEt)Et2Ft)T¡1
t=0 such that









for all t = 0;¢¢¢ ;T ¡ 2 and Et 2 Ft.
7 Concluding comments
We have examined if and to what extent choice dispositions can allow dependence on
contexts and at the same time maintain dynamic consistency, on the case of opportunity
dependence due to being aﬀected by anticipated regret. First, we went over the general
method of resolution of potential inconsistency, by taking any kinds of inconsistency as
given constraints. Second, we characterized a class of choice dispositions that are consis-
tent to arrival of information but may be inconsistent to changing opportunities. Finally,
we considered the full requirement of dynamic consistency and showed that it necessar-
ily implies independence of choice opportunities. The last result states that opportunity
dependence and full dynamic consistency cannot coexist.
33Our result does not yet exclude a possibility that there exists some type of context
dependence which rather reinforces dynamic consistency. However, it should be noted that
the pursuit of (full) dynamic consistency severely limits the varieties of choice dispositions
that are admitted in the static life.
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